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Abstract 
Exchange rate regimes evolution in the European transition economies refers to one of the most 
crucial policy decision in the beginning of the 1990s employed during the initial stages of the 
transition process. During the period of last two decades we may identify some crucial milestones in 
the exchange rate regimes evolution in the European transition economies. due to existing diversity in 
exchange rate arrangements in the European transition economies in the pre-ERM2 period there 
seems to be two big groups of countries - “peggers” (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) and 
“floaters” (Czech republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovak republic, Slovenia). Despite the fact, 
there seems to be no real prospective alternative to euro adoption for the European transition 
economies, we emphasize disputable effects of sacrificing monetary sovereignty in the view of positive 
effects of exchange rate volatility and exchange rate based adjustments in the country experiencing 
sudden shifts in the business cycle. In the chapter we analyze effects of the real exchange rate 
volatility on real output and inflation in ten European transition economies. From estimated VAR 
model (recursive Cholesky decomposition is employed to identify structural shocks) we compute 
impulse-response functions to analyze responses of real output and inflation to negative real exchange 
rate shocks. Results of estimated model are discussed from a prospective of the fixed versus flexible 
exchange rate dilemma. To provide more rigorous insight into the problem of the exchange rate 
regime suitability we estimate the model for each particular country employing data for two 
subsequent periods 2000-2007 and 2000-2011. 
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1. Introduction 
Nowadays, in the time of economic and debt crisis, many European Union member 
countries are exposed to the large complex of negative implications of recession, peaking 
rates of unemployment, increased public debt burden as well as worsen conditions to maintain 
fiscal sustainability. Moreover, increased uncertainty on the financial markets resulted in 
higher volatility of market prices/rates reduces predictability of market trends, even in the 
short period. As a result, increased instability of exchange rates seems to be inevitable but 
painful implication. Due to many external causes we may also experience sudden changes in 
determination potential of exchanges rate especially toward key aspects of macroeconomic 
performance in countries under flexible exchange rate arrangements. One of the most 
controversial implications of different exchange rate arrangements is addressed to their 
appropriateness and sustainability in countries at different stage of business cycle in short 
period while reflecting the overall macroeconomic performance. Wide range of such 
implications became highly discussed especially in the group of countries (so called European 
transition economies1 which joined European Union in 2004. It may seem that fixed versus 
flexible exchange rates dilemma in the period of increased global uncertainty and negative 
trends in the global economy became alive again while discussions on policy issues, 
challenges and controversies may find it difficult to provide clear suggestions. 
                                                          
1 Bulgaria, Czech republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovak republic, Slovenia. 
European transition economies already challenged a decision to adopt euro and 
participate in the project of common currency in the Eurozone together with Western 
European countries few years before world economic crisis arises. Among many 
circumstances and policy issues associated with a proposition of convenient time table for the 
schedule of euro adoption became the sacrifice of monetary sovereignty a highly discussed 
implication. The loss of exchange rate flexibility in the Eurozone candidate countries raised as 
a direct contrary effect of gained exchange rate stability associated with sacrificed monetary 
sovereignty. Despite real benefits of fixing exchange rate to euro followed by the euro 
adoption it may seem that the risks of loss in mutual interconnections between the overall 
macroeconomic development and the exchange rate leading path are still not well observed in 
the current empirical literature. 
Exchange rate regimes evolution in the European transition economies refers to one of 
the most crucial policy decision in the beginning of the 1990s employed during the initial 
stages of the transition process. Despite its differences there seem to be some similar features 
of the starting point affecting exchange rate regime choice in each particular economy, such 
as similar macroeconomic development after initial transition shock (recession followed by 
restoration of macroeconomic stability), number of transition packages employed to support 
market principles and incentives as well as intention to apply for European Union 
membership followed by the euro adoption in the near future.  
During the period of last two decades we may identify some crucial milestones in the 
exchange rate regimes evolution in the European transition economies. Macroeconomic 
stability, as one of the primary objectives in the initial phase of the transition process, 
revealed an absence of nominal anchor and its crucial role in reducing the risks of excessive 
external imbalances while providing firm constrains for national authorities. A decision to 
adopt so pegged exchange rate regimes (feasibility to estimate the “right” equilibrium 
exchange rate may be still disputable) might seem to be the most convenient and appropriate 
solution to reduce current account imbalances, strengthen fiscal discipline and provide a 
suitable anchor for prudential monetary policy. On the other hand, sustainability of pegged 
exchange rate is obviously determined by central bank’s ability to maintain safe level of 
exchange reserves. Inadequate stock of foreign exchange held by central banks in Bulgaria, 
Romania and Slovenia refers as a most common reason to their inability to establish soft-
pegged exchange rate regime in the early 1990s. Despite general expectations, European 
transition economies did not follow a common trend in the exchange rate regime evolution 
during last two decades. Central European countries (Czech republic, Hungary, Poland, 
Slovak republic) have experienced a long trend of successive shift from soft-pegged exchange 
rate regimes to floating regimes. Baltic countries implemented pegged exchange rate regimes 
in the first half of the 1990s. Estonia and Lithuania anchored exchange rate based stabilization 
by employing hard peg regime (currency board), while Latvia implemented soft peg regime 
(conventional fixed pegs). Bulgaria challenged financial crisis in 1996-97 initiated by 
imbalanced growth and low credibility (excessive amount of failed commercial bank loans) 
followed by forced shift from floating regime (managed floating) to hard peg regime 
(currency board). Romania and Slovenia remained as the only two countries not enjoying 
benefits of exchange rate based stabilization and kept employing floating exchange rate 
regimes during the whole period. 
Determination process of the exchange rates leading path in the European transition 
economies followed quite similar principles in the long run. At the same time, it has also 
reflected effects of many specific features of the transition process, i.e. structural changes in 
the production base, institutional changes, deregulation of markets, changing structure of 
relative prices, etc. All those country-specific processes substantially affected long-run trends 
(even in the area of the exchange rate determination), that is why a rigorous insight into their 
principles seems to be crucial for understanding and implementation the appropriate exchange 
rate regime in particular country from the group of the European transition economies. 
Considering a substantial similarity of exchange rate regimes employed by the most of 
the European transition economies in the early 1990s (provided their diversity at later stages 
of the transition process) similar initial conditions at the starting point of the transition process 
seem to be a crucial for its understanding. A decision to adopt pegged exchange rate regimes 
reveals an intention to benefit from firm external nominal anchor in fighting high inflation 
and reducing costs of disinflationary process. Such an approach reflected the fact that the 
most of the countries from the past Eastern bloc performed as small opened economies. After 
successful accession of the European transition economies to the European Union in 2004 and 
2007 (Bulgaria and Romania) it seems that new European Union countries with flexible 
exchange rate arrangements enjoyed higher exchange rate stability. Participation of national 
currencies in ERM 2 followed by euro adoption seems to be the only feasible solution at the 
final stage of the successful lung-run integration process of the European transition 
economies. 
Despite the fact, there seems to be no real prospective alternative to euro adoption for 
the European transition economies, we emphasize disputable effects of sacrificing monetary 
sovereignty in the view of positive effects of exchange rate volatility and exchange rate based 
adjustments in the country experiencing sudden shifts in the business cycle. On the other 
hand, due to existing diversity in exchange rate arrangements in the European transition 
economies in the pre-ERM2 period there seems to be two big groups of countries - “peggers” 
(Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) and “floaters” (Czech republic, Hungary2, Poland, 
Romania, Slovak republic, Slovenia). Effects of sacrificing exchange rate flexibility and its 
spurious effects on real output and inflation can be conventionally interpreted as fixed versus 
flexible exchange rates dilemma. At the same time, macroeconomic effects of various 
exchange rate arrangements during the crisis period may provide a better insight into 
suitability of relative exchange rate volatility in each individual economy during sudden 
changes in the business cycle. 
In the chapter we analyze effects of the real exchange rate volatility on real output and 
inflation in ten European transition economies. From estimated VAR model (recursive 
Cholesky decomposition is employed to identify structural shocks) we compute impulse-
response functions to analyze responses of real output and inflation of positive real exchange 
rate shocks. Results of estimated model are discussed from prospective of fixed versus 
flexible exchange rate dilemma. To provide more rigorous insight into the problem of the 
exchange rate regime suitability we estimate the model for each particular country employing 
data for two subsequent periods 2000-2007 and 2000-2011. Comparison of results for both 
models is crucial for analysis of the current economic crisis implications on real output and 
inflation responses to the negative (devaluation or depreciation) real exchange rate 
unexpected shifts. We suggest our results provide a rigorous insight into real exchange rate 
determination potential in ten European transition economies. Relative diversity in real output 
and inflation adjustments under different exchange rate arrangements may reveal disputable 
implications and associated risks of the breakdown in mutual interconnections between the 
overall macroeconomic development and the exchange rate leading path. 
 
2. Overview of Exchange Rate Regime Evolution in the European Transition Economies 
Macroeconomic stability, fast recovery from deep and sudden transition shock and 
real output growth stimulation represents one of the most challenging objectives for the 
European transition economies in the early 1990s. Consistent choice as well as flexible 
                                                          
2 Hungarian forint operated during pre-crisis period in de facto fixed peg regime, but due to substantial range for 
fluctuations provided by wide horizontal bands it was included in the group of countries, so called “floaters” 
adjustments of monetary policy framework and exchange rate regime accompanied key 
crucial economic policy decisions in this process. Associated changes in monetary-policy 
strategy reflected wide range of macroeconomic aspects underlying sustainability of 
appropriate exchange rate regime choice. 
Among key determinants of the exchange rate regime choice in the European 
transition economies at the beginning of the 1990s we may consider an effort to regain 
macroeconomic stability, foreign exchange reserves requirements and availability, overall 
external economic (trade and financial) openness, etc. At the later stages of transition process 
we emphasize the role of massive foreign capital inflows, sustainability of real economic 
growth, institutional adjustments according to perspectives of ERM2 entry. 
Initial transition shock followed by the sharp real output decline associated with 
intensive inflation pressures (caused by rapid exchange rate devaluations, price liberalization 
and deregulation, tax reforms, fiscal imbalances, etc.) emphasized a crucial importance of 
strong nominal anchor for monetary authorities in restoring a macroeconomic stability and 
confidence as well as positive expectations of economic agents. However immediate 
exchange rate based stabilization became an appropriate strategy only for countries with 
adequate foreign exchange reserves while being able to significantly reduce inflation 
pressures in adequate (short) time period to prevent undesired rapid overvaluation. As a result 
it seems to be convenient to divide the European transition economies in two groups (so 
called “peggers” and “floaters”) considering initial exchange rate regime framework. 
Relative diversity in exchange rate regimes in the European transition economies 
revealed uncertain and spurious conclusions about the exchange rate regime choice during last 
two decades. Moreover, Eurozone membership perspective (de jure pegging to euro) realizes 
uncertain consequences of exchange rate regime switching especially in the group of large 
floaters. 
Successful anti-inflationary policy associated with stabilization of inflation expectations 
in the European transition economies at the end of 1990s significantly increased the role of 
short-term interest rates in the monetary policy strategies. At the same time, so called 
qualitative approach to the monetary policy decision-making performed in the low inflation 
environment, gradually enhanced the role of real interest rates expectations in the process of 
nominal interest rates determination. However, economic crisis increased uncertainty on the 
markets and thus worsen expectations (inflation expectations including) of agents. 
Eurozone member countries as well as global economy are currently exposed to the 
negative effects of the economic and debt crisis. To alleviate recession and support economic 
recovery, monetary authorities dramatically reduced key interest rates. Low interest rates 
together with quantitative easing, however, should not necessarily increase supply of loans 
due to prudential credit policy of commercial banks reflecting increased uncertainty on the 
markets. As a result, policy of low interest rates seems to be inefficient. 
Exchange rate policy evolution represents one of the key parts of crucial economic 
policy decisions at the beginning of the transition process in countries from the region of 
Central and Eastern Europe in the early 1990s. Despite its complexity and particularity there 
seems to be some similar features at the starting point of transition process in all European 
transition economies such as recession followed by initial transition shock and common 
vision of European union and Economic and Monetary union membership. 
Macroeconomic stability as one of the primary objectives in the initial phase of the 
transition process affected exchange rate regime choice in the European transition economies. 
However, low credibility of monetary institutions, lack of foreign exchange reserves and high 
inflation differentials represented real constraints and difficulties related to the sustainability 
of pegged exchange rate regimes. Brief overview of the exchange rate regimes evolution in 
the European transition economies provides table 1. 
Table 1 Exchange Rate Regimes in the European Transition Economies 
 
 exchange rate regime 
Bulgaria  managed floating currency board 
Czech 
Republic peg with horizontal bands  managed floating 
Estonia  currency board ERM2 eurozone
Hungary adjustable peg crawling peg peg with horizontal bands   managed floating
Latvia  floating conventional fixed peg ERM2 
Lithuania  floating currency board ERM2 
Poland    crawling peg  free floating 
Romania free floating managed floating 
Slovak 
Republic peg with horizontal bands managed floating ERM2 eurozone 
Slovenia  managed floating crawling band ERM2 eurozone 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Note: Exchange rate regime evolution in the European transition economies: Bulgaria - since 1991 floating 
(pegged exchange rate regime undesirable due to possible low credibility), currency board since 1997 (after 
1996-1997financial crisis (public debt, bad commercial banks loans)). Czech Republic - exchange rate pegged to 
currency basket with narrow but continuously widen horizontal bands, since May 1997 after currency attacks 
switch to managed floating with no predetermined path for the exchange rate with DEM (EUR) as reference 
currency. Estonia - currency board since 1992 till 2011 (euro adoption), plan to adopt in 2008 but delayed due 
high inflation, since 2011 eurozone membership. Hungary - managed floating till February 1995, since March 
1995 till the end of 1999 crawling peg with continuously decreased rate of periodical devaluation and widen 
horizontal bands, since January 2000  exchange rate pegged to euro combined with wide horizontal bands (since 
May 2001), since May 2008 managed floating with EUR as reference currency. Latvia - since February 1994 
exchange rate pegged to SDR (fixing the exchange rate to a basket of currencies (SDR) instead of a single 
currency serves to promote long-term stability) (since January 2005 pegged to EUR). Lithuania - since April 
1994 currency board (exchange rate pegged to USD, in February 2002 pegging switched to EUR). Poland - since 
the end of 1991 crawling peg with continuously decreased rate of periodical devaluation and widen horizontal 
bands, since April 2000 free floating. Romania - free floating, since 1998 exchange rate arrangement reclassified 
as managed floating. Slovak Republic - exchange rate pegged to currency basket with narrow but continuously 
widen horizontal bands, since October 1998 after currency attacks switch to managed floating with no 
predetermined path for the exchange rate with DEM (EUR) as reference currency, since 2009 eurozone 
membership. Slovenia - managed floating with no predetermined path for the exchange rate (since February 
2002 crawling band - the monetary authority manages the float of the domestic currency within certain 
fluctuating margins around a depreciating path - a heavily-managed crawling band with pragmatic monetary, 
real, external and financial indicators). 
ERM2 - June 2004 - Estonia (left in January 2011 after euro adoption), Lithuania, Slovenia (left in January 
2007 after euro adoption) 
    - May 2005 - Latvia 
    - November 2005 - Slovak Republic (left in January 2009 after euro adoption) 
.Source: IMF AREAER 1990-2011, author’s processing. 
 
It seems to be clear that the European transition economies did not follow common 
practice in the process of the exchange rate regime choice at the beginning of the 1990s. 
Small Baltic countries adopted currency board regime (Estonia and Lithuania) eventually 
conventional fixed peg regime (Latvia). Hungary adopted crawling peg regime (after few 
years of adjustable peg in place) together with Poland. Czech Republic and Slovak Republic 
adopted pegged regime with horizontal bands. Despite high inflation rates Bulgaria, Romania 
and Slovenia adopted floating exchange rate regime due to low level of reserves and lack of 
credibility though Bulgaria switched to currency board after 1996-97 financial crisis. It seems 
to be clear that most of the European transition economies enjoyed disinflationary and 
credibility benefits of so called hard or soft exchange rate regimes. Fixed exchange rates as 
the nominal anchor significantly contributed to the successful disinflationary process at the 
end of the 1990s. 
Till the end of the decade many countries from the group switched to more flexible 
exchange rate regimes (Czech Republic in 1997, Slovak Republic in 1998 and Poland in 
2000). Similarly Hungary switched to intermediate regime by widening horizontal bands. 
Although Hungary stacked to exchange rate pegged to euro, by employing wide horizontal 
bands de facto followed the same trend as previous group of countries. 
Exchange rate regime choice also affected corresponding monetary policy strategy 
framework. Countries with exchange rate as nominal anchor (hard pegs or soft pegs with 
narrow horizontal bands) successfully implemented exchange rage targeting. Countries with 
soft pegs (pegs with wide horizontal bands or crawling pegs) and floating regimes employed 
monetary targets as intermediate criteria of monetary policy (monetary targeting). 
Overall success of disinflationary process represents one of the key milestones on the 
road to stable macroeconomic environment with crucial role of low and stable inflation 
expectations. Low inflation combined with stable inflation expectations is considered to be a 
substantial condition for switching from quantitative (money supply) to qualitative (interest 
rates) approach in monetary policy decision-making. This adjustment in monetary policy 
strategies seems to be obvious in the European transition economies since the end of 1990s as 
a part of prevailing trend in weakening of relationship between money and inflation. 
Increased role of inflation expectations together with raising credibility of monetary 
authorities resulted in adoption of direct (explicit) inflation targeting strategy in many 
European transition economies - Czech Republic (1998), Poland (1999), Hungary (2001), 
Slovenia (2002), Romania (2005) and Slovak Republic (2005).  
European transition economies challenged a decision of a euro adoption and Eurozone 
membership several years before the economic crisis arises. Disputable policy implications of 
sacrificing monetary sovereignty rose as a crucial assumption affecting main features as well 
as durability of preparation phase timetable in countries with flexible exchange rate regimes 
(Czech Republic, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic and Slovenia). Among a variety of 
determinants and aspects we emphasize the role of decisions inevitably associated with 
“right” scheduling of the Eurozone entry. Some countries from the group of the European 
transition economies already joined the Eurozone (Estonia (2011), Slovak Republic (2009), 
Slovenia (2007)) followed by participation of their currencies in ERM2 (Estonia (June 2004), 
Slovak Republic (November 2005), Slovenia (June 2004)). On the other hand currencies of 
Lithuania and Latvia are still participating on ERM2. 
The loss from sacrificing exchange rates flexibility in the Eurozone candidate 
countries became directly confronted with benefits related to exchange rate stability 
associated with sacrificing monetary autonomy. Despite plausible advantages of pegging 
exchange rates of candidate countries to euro followed by the euro adoption it seems to be 
clear that risks associated with potential effects of breakdown in mutual interconnections 
between macroeconomic development and flexible exchange rates leading path seem to be of 
a minor interest in current empirical literature. 
Economic theory provides clear suggestions in fixed versus flexible exchange rates 
dilemma in fighting high inflation pressures. At the same time exchange rate based 
enhancement of external competitiveness may provide a convenient framework to foster 
economic growth even when domestic economy is cooling down. On the other hand, 
incentives to increase external demand during the crisis period may start unfavorable spiral of 
competitive devaluations. Central banks and governments may tend to devaluate currencies 
(internal devaluation) especially in times when low interest rates policy associated with 
quantitative easing doesn’t provide correct and sufficient incentives to foster domestic 
demand. Internal devaluation causing real exchange rate to depreciate became highly 
discussed nowadays, in the time of economic and debt crisis in Eurozone, when inability of 
low performing economies to increase foreign competitiveness of their production forces 
authorities to experiment with internal devaluation considering all adjustments are made by 
prices, wages (and associated costs of production) and assets values falling. 
 
3. Overview of the Literature 
Effects of the real exchange rate volatility on the macroeconomic performance of 
countries at the different stages of business cycle are well document in the empirical 
literature. Aguirre a Calderón (Aguirre a Calderón, 2005) analyzed the role of the real 
exchange rate in determining the real output volatility on the sample consisting of 60 
countries implementing cointegration analysis using panel data. Burdekin a Siklos (Burdekin 
a Siklos, 1999) investigated implications of the exchange rate regime shifts to price level 
development in the United Kingdom, United States, Canada and Sweden. Domac, Peters 
a Yuzefowich (Domac, Peters a Yuzefowich, 2001) observed mutual relationships between 
the exchange rate regime and macroeconomic performance of the selected European transition 
economies (Czech republic, Hungary, Estonia, Poland and Slovenia). Ghosh, Gulde, Ostry 
a Wolf (Ghosh, Gulde, Ostry a Wolf, 1996) analyzed effects of the alternative exchange rate 
regimes on inflation and economic growth on the sample of 145 countries during the 30 years 
period. Levy-Yeyati a Sturzenegger (Levy-Yeyati a Sturzenegger, 2001) observed 
implications of exchange rate volatility on domestic price level, money supply, real interest 
rates and real output in 154 countries since 1974 till 1979. Arratibel, Furceri, Martin 
and Zdzienicka (Arratibel, Furceri, Martin and Zdzienicka, 2011) investigated relationships 
between exchange rates development and foreign direct investments, domestic loans and 
current account on the sample of 9 countries from the Central and Eastern Europe. Lee 
a Chinn (Lee a Chinn, 1998) analyzed implications of real exchange rate fluctuations on the 
current account development in 7 most developed industrial countries. Sek a Chuah (Sek 
a Chuah, 2011) explored causality between the exchange rate changes and the current account 
dynamics in 6 Asian countries. Arghyrou a Chortareas (Arghyrou a Chortareas, 2008) 
investigated effects of the exchange rate volatility on the current account adjustments in 11 
Eurozone member countries. Obstfeld a Rogoff (Obstfeld a Rogoff, 2005) focused their 
investigation on estimation of effects of global current account imbalances reduction on 
exchange rates (USD, EUR and Asian currency) equilibrium path in the model with 
alternative scenarios. 
 
4. Fixed versus Flexible Exchange Rate Dilemma 
To estimate effects of the real exchange rate variability on industrial production and 
inflation in the European transition economies under different exchange rate arrangements we 
divided countries from our group to two groups - “peggers” (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania) and “floaters” (Czech republic, Hungary3, Poland, Romania, Slovak republic, 
                                                          
3 Hungarian forint operated during pre-crisis period in de facto fixed peg regime, but due to substantial range for 
fluctuations provided by wide horizontal bands it was included in the group of countries, so called “floaters” 
Slovenia). Responses of industrial production and inflation to the exchange rate depreciation 
under different exchange rate regimes seems to be crucial for estimation and understanding of 
possible effects related to the exogeneity of exchange rate shocks. 
Exchange rate flexibility (i.e. exchange rate depreciation as a result of economic 
growth cool down) serves as a convenient vehicle for exchange rate based recovery (i.e. 
automatic adjustment process) through increased competitiveness of domestic production on 
markets home and abroad provided there are flexible adjustments to price incentives on the 
markets. On the other hand, exchange rates shifts (under fixed exchange rate regime) 
associated with volatility of main reference currency serving as the nominal anchor are 
usually not originated by changes in domestic economy (i.e. real output fluctuations during 
the business cycle turnovers in country with fixed exchange rate) and thus may act as 
unexpected and destabilizing shock reducing its price effects on demand. As a result we 
suggest that the exchange rate downward flexibility may provide wide range of incentives 
stimulating overall demand and thus accelerate economic growth in the recession. Exchange 
rate rigidity under fixed exchange rate arrangement may stabilize exchange rate expectations 
with positive contributions to the overall macroeconomic stability. Sudden shifts in exchange 
rate of the reference currency may cause a fixed exchange rate of domestic currency to 
become volatile. Moreover, exchange rate based adjustments of real output will not work 
provided that price incentives may be associated with false signals and spurious effects on 
expected short-term exchange rate leading path. 
Effects of the exchange rate volatility on inflation, as a part of the fixed versus flexible 
exchange rates dilemma, refer to relative changes in prices of exports and imports and 
associated price effects on the aggregate price level. Under fixed exchange rate arrangement, 
credible nominal anchor (i.e. sound foreign currency of a country with a low and stable 
inflation) provides very efficient tool in fighting high inflation while helping to stabilize 
inflation expectations. As a result, country with fixed exchange rate should experience 
successful periods of disinflation (provided that a decision to adopt fixed exchange rate 
originated from high inflation pressures). Ability of the country to achieve price stability (and 
maintain low inflation differentials) within a reasonable period of time seems to be crucial for 
fixed exchange rate sustainability. It seems that stable inflation expectations anchored by 
fixed exchange rate to credible foreign currency represent a crucial role for understanding 
price effects of the sudden exchange rate shifts. Exchange rate volatility under fixed exchange 
rate arrangement originated in anchoring foreign currency instability may cause domestic 
price level to adjust accordingly in the short period, though persisting inflation or disinflation 
pressures are not expected. It is especially due to positive effects of stable inflation 
expectations that (we suggest) do not seem to be affected for longer period of time. 
On the other hand, price stability in countries with flexible exchange rate arrangement 
obviously suffers even more in the short period due to absence of credible nominal anchor 
provided that the monetary policy strategy of the central bank is based on either inflation 
targeting or interest rate transmission channel. Low levels of inflation targeted by the 
monetary authority are obviously more sensitive to exogenous price shocks originated in the 
sudden and unexpected exchange rate shifts. Price effects of exchange rate volatility in 
countries with flexible exchange rate arrangements may be even strengthened by 
corresponding effects of real output or its components to unexpected movements of exchange 
rate on domestic price level as a part of the exchange rate adjustment process. As a result, 
exchange rate fluctuations in countries with flexible exchange rate arrangements are usually 
associated with more intensive a durable adjustment in price level. 
Quite specific seems to be a situation in countries with fixed exchange rate 
arrangement and anchoring currency that serves as a local or global currency widely used in 
foreign transactions. Real output and price effects of volatility in reference currency leading 
path may be reduced provided that a large number of trading partners are also fixing their 
exchange rate against same reference currency (membership of countries in currency union 
with our reference currency as common currency seems to have the same effect). Even when 
the large portion of foreign transactions in country with fixed exchange rate against such 
anchoring currency were immune to the reference currency volatility, remaining transactions 
are still exposed to the reference currency exchange rate unexpected shifts. On the other hand, 
real exchange rate sudden shifts are not exclusively caused by the nominal exchange rate 
volatility. Increased intensity of price adjustments associated with crisis related effects on real 
output are usually followed by accelerated deviations of real exchange rates from their 
equilibrium leading path especially in the short period. 
Effects of exchange rate volatility on the price level in countries with different 
exchange rate regime may be even strengthened during the crisis period. Excessive price 
adjustments due to uncertainty and lower predictability of the exchange rate leading path 
under flexible exchange rate arrangement, regardless of the sources and intensity of exchange 
rate instability, reflects the absence of a nominal anchor to stabilize inflation expectations. At 
the same time, inflation expectations anchored by the credible foreign currency, provides 
more fundamentally appropriate framework to preserve and sustain price stability. 
 
5. Econometric Model 
VAR models represent dynamic systems of equations in which the current level of 
each variable depends on past movements of that variable and all other variables involved in 
the system. Residuals of vector t  represent unexplained movements in variables (effects of 
exogenous shocks hitting the model); however as complex functions of structural shocks 
effects they have no economic interpretation. Structural shocks can be still recovered using 
transformation of true form representation into reduced-form by imposing a number of 
identifying restrictions. Applied restrictions should reflect some general assumptions about 
the underlying structure of the economy and they are obviously derived from economic 
theory. There are two general (most used) approaches to identify VAR models. Cholesky 
decomposition of innovations implies the contemporaneous interactions between the 
exogenous shocks and the endogenous variables are characterized by a Wald causal chain. 
Ordering of the endogenous variables than reflects expected particular economy structure 
following general economic theory assumptions. However the lack of reasonable guidance for 
appropriate ordering led to the development of more sophisticated and flexible identification 
methods - structural VAR (SVAR) models. Identifying restrictions implemented in SVAR 
models reflects theoretical assumptions about the economy structure more precisely. 
We implement a VAR methodology to analyze macroeconomic aspects of the real 
exchange rate volatility in the Central European countries. Cholesky decomposition of 
variance-covariance matrix of the reduced-form VAR residuals is implemented to estimate 
effects of the real exchange rate fluctuations on the selected main macroeconomic indicators 
variability. 
True model is represented by the following infinite moving average representation: 
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where tX  represents  x 1n  a vector including endogenous variables of the model, ( )A L is a 
 x n n  polynomial consisting of the matrices of coefficients to be estimated in the lag operator 
L  representing the relationship among variables on the lagged values, t  is  x 1n  vector of 
identically normally distributed, serially uncorrelated and mutually orthogonal errors (white 
noise disturbances that represent the unexplained movements in the variables, reflecting the 
influence of exogenous shocks): 
        0,     ' I,    '       0t t t t sE E E t s                    (2) 
 
Vector tX  consists of six endogenous variables - industrial production  ,r ty , money 
supply  tm , core inflation  tp , short-term nominal interest rates  ,n tir  and real exchange 
rate  ,r ter . In the five-variable VAR model  , , ,, , , ,  r t t t n t r tt ip m p ir erX      we assume five 
exogenous shocks that contemporaneously affects endogenous variables - demand shock 
 ,rip t , nominal shock  ,m t , inflation shock  ,p t , monetary policy shock  ,n tir  
and exchange rate shock  ,r ter . 
The structural exogenous shocks from equation (1) are not directly observable due to 
the complexity of information included in true form VAR residuals. As a result structural 
shocks cannot by correctly identified. It is than necessary to transform true model into 
following reduced form  
 
1 ( )   t ttX C L Y e       (3) 
 
where ( )C L  is the polynomial of matrices with coefficients representing the relationship 
among variables on the lagged values and te  is a x 1n  vector of normally distributed errors 
(shocks in reduced form) that are serially uncorrelated but not necessarily orthogonal: 
          0 0 0 00,    ' ' '  ',    '       0t u t t t t t sE e E ee A E A A A E ee t s          (4) 
 
Relationship between reduced-form VAR residuals  te  and structural shocks  t  
can be expressed as follows: 
 
0t te A        (5) 
 
As we have already noted at the beginning of the chapter we implement a Cholesky 
identification scheme to correctly identify structural shocks. In order to identify our model 
there must be exactly  2 2 / 2n n n     relationships among the endogenous variables of the 
model, where n represents a number of variables. We have to impose  2 / 2n n  restrictions 
on the matrix 0A  based on the Cholesky decomposition of the reduced-form VAR residual 
matrix that define matrix 0A  as a lower triangular matrix. The lower triangularity of 0A  (all 
elements above the diagonal are zero) implies a recursive scheme (structural shocks are 
identified through reduced-form VAR residuals) among variables (the Wald chain scheme) 
that has clear economic implications and has to be empirically tested as any other 
relationship. Identification scheme of the matrix 0A  implies that particular contemporaneous 
interactions between some exogenous shocks and some endogenous variables are restricted 
reflecting causal (distribution) chain of interaction transmission. It is clear that the Wald 
causal chain is incorporated via convenient ordering of the variables. 
Considering lower triangularity of a matrix 0A  the equation (5) can be rewritten as 
follows: 
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     (6) 
 
Correct identification of the exogenous structural shocks reflecting Cholesky ordering 
of variables denotes following assumptions: 
 Industrial production doesn’t contemporaneously respond to the shock from any other 
endogenous variable of the model. 
 Money supply doesn’t contemporaneously respond to inflation, interest rate, and 
exchange rate shocks, while it is contemporaneously affected only by the industrial 
production shock. 
 Inflation doesn’t contemporaneously respond to the interest rate and exchange rate 
shocks, while it is contemporaneously affected by the industrial production and money 
supply shocks. 
 Interest rate doesn’t contemporaneously respond to current account shock, while it is 
contemporaneously affected by the industrial production, money supply, inflation and 
interest rate shocks. 
 Exchange rate is contemporaneously affected by the shocks from all of the 
endogenous variables of the model. 
 
After initial period endogenous variables may interact freely without any restrictions.  
Estimated VAR model is used to compute impulse response functions to analyse 
responses of endogenous variables to the one standard deviation negative exchange rate shock 
in the European transition economies countries. To check the robustness of the empirical 
results we estimate the model considering different ordering of the endogenous variables in 
both models (model A (2000M1-2007M12) and model B (2000M1-2011M12)): 
 model A1, B1  , , ,, , , ,  rip t t t n t r tt y m p ir erX      
 model A2, B2  , , ,, , , ,  rip t r t t n t tt y er m ir pX      
 model A3, B3  , , ,, , , ,  rip t t t n t r tt y p m ir erX      
 
6. Data and Results 
We employed monthly data for period 2000M1-2007M12 (model A) consisting of 96 
observations and with period 2000M1-2011M12 (model B) consisting of 144 observations for 
the following endogenous variables - industrial production4 (nominal volume of the industrial 
product deflated by averaged PPI), money supply (monetary aggregate M2), inflation (core 
inflation), short-term interest rates (interbank offered rates with 3 months maturity5), 
exchange rate (real effective exchange rate) and balance of payment’s current account (Figure 
11.1). Estimation of two models is in line with the primary objective of the chapter to estimate 
effects of the real exchange rate variability to industrial production and inflation considering 
possible implications of economic crisis on presented results. Time series for all endogenous 
                                                          
4 Time series for monthly industrial production were employed due to absence of data on the same basis for real 
output (GDP). 
5 Short-term interest rates in Estonia, Slovak republic and Slovenia we replaced by EURIBOR after euro 
adoption in each particular country (2007, 2009 and 2011). 
variables were drawn from IMF database (International Financial Statistics, February 2013). 
Time series for industrial production, money supply and inflation were seasonally adjusted. 
 
Figure 1 Industrial Production, Money Supply, Inflation, Interest Rates and Real 
Effective Exchange Rate in the European Transition Economies (2000Q1-2011Q4) 
 
 
 
Note: Endogenous variables - industrial production (IP), money supply (M2) and real effective exchange rate 
(REER) are expressed as indexes (left axis in figures) (2005 = 100). Inflation (INF) and interest rates (IR) are 
expressed in percentage (right axis in figures). 
Source: Compiled by author based on data taken from IMF - International Financial Statistics (February 2013). 
 
To correctly identify exogenous shocks hitting the model as well as to compute 
impulse-response functions it is necessary VAR model to be stationary. To check the model it 
is necessary to test the time series for unit roots and cointegration. 
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A. Testing Procedures 
The augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and the Phillips-Perron (PP) tests were 
computed to test the endogenous variables for the unit roots presence. Both ADF and PP tests 
indicate that most of the variables are non-stationary on the values so that the null hypothesis 
of a unit root cannot be rejected for any of the series. Testing variables on the first differences 
indicates the time series are stationary so that we conclude that the variables are I(1). 
Because there are endogenous variables with a unit root on the values it is necessary to 
the test the time series for cointegration using the Johansen and Juselius cointegration test (we 
found reasonable to include variables I(0) for testing purposes following economic logic of 
expected results). The test for the cointegration was computed using three lags as 
recommended by the AIC (Akaike Information Criterion) and SIC (Schwarz Information 
Criterion). 
The results of the Johansen cointegration tests confirmed the results of the unit root 
tests. Both trace statistics and maximum eigenvalue statistics (both at 0.05 level) indicate that 
there is no cointegration among the endogenous variables of the model. 
To test the stability of the VAR model we also applied a number of diagnostic tests. 
We found no evidence of serial correlation, heteroskedasticity and autoregressive conditional 
heteroskedasticity effect in the disturbances. The model also passes the Jarque-Bera normality 
test, so that errors seem to be normally distributed. The VAR models seem to be stable also 
because the inverted roots of the model for each country lie inside the unit circle. Detailed 
results of time series testing procedures are not reported here to save space. Like any other 
results, they are available upon request from the author. 
Following the results of the unit root and cointegration tests we estimated the model 
using the variables in the first differences so that we can calculate impulse-response functions 
for all ten European transition economies. In line with the main objective of the chapter we 
focus on interpretation of the responses of industrial production and inflation on the negative 
one standard deviation exchange rate shock. We also observe effects of economic crisis on the 
exchange rate determination potential in the European transition economies by comparing the 
results for models estimated using time series for two different periods - model A (2000M1-
2007M12) and model B (2000M1-2011M12). 
Changed ordering of the variables didn’t seem to affect the results of the analysis. 
Considering impulse-response functions are not very sensitive to the endogenous variables 
ordering we present the results of the models (model A1 and B1) with default ordering of the 
endogenous variables (detailed results for models A2, A3, B2, B3 are available upon request 
from the author). 
 
B. Crisis Effects on Volatility of Inflation and Exchange Rates  
One of the most significant effects of the economic crisis refer to sudden changes in 
the price level accompanied by diverse effects on relative prices and thus changing relative 
prices. So called redistributive price effects (even on international level) seem to be much 
more significant among large number of countries provided that they are operating a common 
market for free goods, services, labor and capital movements. 
The figure 2 provides an overview of the inflation differentials calculated on 1, 3 and 
6 months basis in the European transition economies during the period 2000-2011. We 
suggest that smaller volatility in inflation differentials reveals slower speed of adjustment in 
price level to the price effects of market forces and thus reflects higher stability of inflation 
expectations. Sudden and sharp shifts in the inflation differentials seem to be associated with 
higher speed of adjustment in the price level with negative impact to the stability of inflation 
expectations. 
 
Figure 2 Volatility of Inflation Adjustments (2000M1-2011M12) 
 
 
 
Note: Curves represent inflation differentials calculated on 1, 3 a 6 month basis. 
Source: Author’s calculation. 
 
Volatility of inflation rates reveals relatively high diversity among individual 
countries. Despite some minor exception, Baltic countries (“peggers”) experienced relatively 
stable speed of adjustment in the rates of inflation during the whole pre-crisis period. 
However, with increasing lag for differencing the inflation rates it seems that a volatility of 
inflation differentials increased. The last country from the group of “peggers”, Bulgaria, 
experienced little more volatile adjustments in the rates of inflation. It seems that the strong 
nominal anchor may provide a convenient vehicle for the reduction of inflation pressures 
however doesn’t seem to be sufficient to successfully stabilize inflation expectations, 
especially in the low performing transition economy. Our results also reflect slightly higher 
average volatility of inflation differentials in the group of “floaters” during the pre-crisis 
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period. The Czech republic and Slovenia seem to be provide the best results followed by the 
Slovak republic and Hungary. Despite the absence of nominal anchor (i.e. fixed exchange 
rate) in this group of four countries it seems that adoption of direct inflation targeting was 
associated with reduction in the speed of inflation rates adjustment and thus providing very 
efficient framework for stabilizing inflation expectations. The highest speed of adjustment in 
price level we experienced in case of Romania reflects the absence of credible nominal anchor 
especially during the first half of the pre-crisis period. Inflation targeting implemented at the 
later stage in the low inflation environment significantly helped to reduce the volatility of 
inflation adjustment. 
 
Figure 3 Volatility of Exchange Rates Adjustments (2000M1-2011M12) 
 
 
 
Note: Curves represent real exchange rate differentials calculated on 1, 3 a 6 month basis. 
Source: Author’s calculation. 
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Economic crisis affected the volatility of inflation adjustments in the European 
transition economies with ambiguous results. Overall volatility of inflation in the European 
transition economies during the crisis period significantly increased especially due to sharp 
decrease in the rate of inflation followed by peaking inflation pressures at the end of the pre-
crisis period. Strong nominal anchor in the group of “peggers” (the size of the group increased 
due to new Eurozone member countries - Slovenia (2007) and Slovak republic (2009)) even 
accelerated disinflation processes in countries with fixed exchange rate arrangement. On the 
other hand, countries from the group of “floaters” experienced similar scenario of increased 
inflation adjustments volatility during the crisis period. Finally, due to complexity of the crisis 
effects on the volatility of inflation adjustments we provide some insight into fixed versus 
flexible exchange rate dilemma in the part C. 
The figure 3 provides an overview of the real exchange rates differentials calculated 
on 1, 3 and 6 months basis in the European transition economies during the period 2000-2011. 
The overall volatility of the exchange rates adjustments seems to be significantly higher in 
comparison to the volatility of inflation adjustments. Despite effects of price adjustments, real 
exchange rates are determined by either nominal exchange rate adjustments (under flexible 
exchange rates arrangements) or adjustments in the exchange rate of the anchoring reference 
currency. As a result, real exchange rates may become more volatile (even under fixed 
exchange rate arrangement) provided that the leading paths of the nominal exchange rate and 
the rate of inflation follow different trend. On the other hand, the real exchange rate volatility 
may be reduced (under flexible exchange rate arrangement) provided that the nominal 
exchange rate leading paths (determining external purchasing power of the currency) is 
associated with inflation differentials and corresponding adjustments of the domestic price 
level (determining internal purchasing power of the currency). 
It seems that real exchange rates leading path of countries from the group of “peggers” 
reflected slightly higher stability in comparison of those from the group of “floaters” during 
the pre-crisis period. It seems that the volatility of nominal exchange rates in countries with 
flexible exchange rate arrangements was not inevitably associated with inflation differentials 
causing higher real exchange rates variability. Economic crisis increased exchange market 
pressures (Stavarek, 2012). As a result, nominal and real exchange rates of countries from the 
group of “floaters” became much more volatile. The lack of credible nominal anchor made 
freely floated exchange rates much more sensitive to the market imperfections. Here again we 
observed the stabilizing effects of the euro adoption to the real exchange rate deviations 
during the crisis period in Slovenia and Slovak republic. 
 
C. Impulse-Response Function 
In order to analyze effects of the real exchange rate volatility under different exchange 
rate arrangements in the European transition economies we estimate responses of industrial 
production and inflation to the negative (devaluation or depreciation) one standard deviation 
exchange rate shock employing monthly data for two subsequent periods 2000-2007 (model 
A) and 2000-2011 (model B). 
In the figure 4 we summarize impulse-response functions of the endogenous variables 
for the model with time series for the pre-crisis period (model A1) in the European transition 
economies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 Responses of Industrial Production and Inflation to REER Shock (2000M1-
2007M12) (Model A) 
 
 
 
Note: Curves represent responses of industrial production (IP) and inflation (INF) to the one standard deviation 
negative exchange rate shock in each country from the group of European transition economies. 
Source: Author’s calculation. 
 
The figure 4 shows estimated responses of industrial production and inflation to the 
Cholesky positive one standard deviation negative REER shock (depreciation or devaluation 
of real exchange rate) in the European transition economies during the pre-crisis period. It 
seems to be clear that the negative exchange rate shock was followed by the industrial 
production (IP) increase in all ten European transition economies. This investigation is in line 
with a general empirical experience considering the exchange rate depreciation causes an 
increase in the real output through the net exports (current account surplus). At the same time 
we observed an interesting difference among countries in the length of the initial lag 
associated with the industrial production increase after the exchange rate shock in each 
particular country. Effects of the shock seem to vary across countries especially in the view of 
their exchange rate arrangement. In the group of “peggers” industrial production increased 
after the negative exchange rate shock with just around one month lag. While the intensity of 
the shock seems to be quite similar in these group of countries, its durability slightly differs. 
Initial positive effect of the exchange rate shock died out within one year. Considering 
subsequent adjustment we may conclude that overall effect of the shock in the long run seems 
to be neutral. Situation is different when we focus on the results of industrial production 
responses to the negative exchange rate shock in countries from the group of “floaters”. In 
comparison with countries with fixed exchange rate arrangement it seems that industrial 
production increased with slightly longer lag (around 2-4 months). Moreover, in some 
countries (i.e. Hungary, Romania and Slovenia) we experienced initial negative response of 
industrial production reflecting low price elasticity of external demand immediately after the 
shock (problem known as J-curve). Despite delayed effect of the exchange rate depreciation it 
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is clear that the positive effect of the shock on industrial production seems to be more 
significant and durable in the group of “floaters” thought it has died out in the long run too. 
In general, the negative exchange rate shock should be followed by an increase in the 
inflation provided distribution price chain across countries. Results seem to vary again for 
countries with different exchange rate arrangement. Countries with pegged exchange rates 
experienced a moderate trend of the inflation increase since the first month after the shock. 
Although a negative effect largely culminated within first six months after the shock, its pro-
inflationary effect slightly decreased over the time and completely died out during the second 
year after the shock. On the hand, initial pro-inflationary effect of the negative exchange rate 
shock in the group of countries with flexible exchange rate arrangement seems to be reduced. 
However, negative effect of the shock increased during the second half of the year since the 
shock. At the same time, its impact on inflation subsequently fades out and became similarly 
neutral in the long run. 
The one standard deviation negative exchange rate shock seemed to be neutral in 
determining the leading path of both industrial production and inflation in the long-run in all 
ten European transition economies. On the hand, it causes distorting effects across different 
exchange rate arrangements and thus reveals curious implications of the exchange rate regime 
choice. 
In the figure 5 we summarize impulse-response functions of the endogenous variables 
for the model with time series for the extended period (model B1) in the European transition 
economies. 
 
Figure 5 Responses of Industrial Production and Inflation to REER Shock (2000M1-
2011M12) (Model B) 
 
 
 
Note: Curves represent responses of industrial production (IP) and inflation (INF) to the one standard deviation 
negative exchange rate shock in each country from the group of European transition economies. 
Source: Author’s calculation. 
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The figure 5 shows estimated responses of industrial production and inflation to the 
Cholesky positive one standard deviation negative REER shock (depreciation or devaluation 
of real exchange rate) in the European transition economies during the extended period. Crisis 
period affected responses of industrial production to the exchange rate shock. In the group of 
“peggers” we observed generally more dynamic response (increase) of industrial production 
to the shock. This result may be addressed to more dynamic adjustments to changes in foreign 
competitiveness provided that economic crisis accelerated redistribution effects on the 
international level. Moreover, this shock in the group of “peggers”, caused by sudden shifts in 
the exchange rate of the foreign anchoring currency, serves as a vehicle for transmission of 
impulses not originated in domestic economy and thus seems to have just a temporary effect. 
Despite its increased and more durable impact (in comparison with pre-crisis period) on 
industrial production in the short run, the overall cumulative effect of the shock in the long 
run seems to be neutral. On the other hand, crisis period slightly reduced the length of the 
lagged response (some countries even experienced immediate increase) in industrial 
production to the negative exchange rate shock in the group of “floaters” reflecting higher 
sensitivity to the exchange rate related price effects (size of the effect mostly increased as 
well). At the same time, durability of the positive effects of the shock on industrial production 
increased only at negligible rate, confirming its long run neutrality. 
Course of impulse-response functions of inflation during the extended period 
reflecting crisis contributions to the effects of unexpected exchange rate shifts reveals another 
crucial implication of the exchange rate regime choice. Besides generally reduced inflation 
pressures initiated by the negative exchange rate shock (in comparison with the pre-crisis 
period), countries from the group of “peggers” experienced considerably faster recovery of 
the price stability (negative effect of the shock to the price level died out much earlier) than in 
countries from the group of “floaters”. It seems that the crisis period reduced a durability of 
the shock from the exchange rate sudden shift even more. We suggest that stabilizing effects 
of the exchange rate nominal anchor during the crisis period contributed to the overall 
reduction of price related effects associated with external price shocks. At the same time, 
crisis period increased vulnerability of the domestic price level to the unexpected shifts in the 
short-term leading path of exchange rate. While the total short-term contribution of the 
negative exchange rate shock to the price level is comparable in both periods, the overall 
effect of the shock culminated in most countries from the group of “floaters” with 
significantly reduced lag (during first three months). In both groups of countries price effects 
of the one standard deviation negative exchange rate shock seems to be neutral in the long 
run. 
 
7. Conclusion 
Exchange rates determined main macroeconomic indicators in all ten European 
transition economies in the line with the general empirical investigations though we observed 
some specific implications of the distorting effects caused by the unpredicted exchange rate 
shifts during the crisis period that may be a subject of further academic discussion focusing 
on the wide causalities of the economic crisis. At the same time our results suggest some 
plausible causality between exchange rate regime and the way that the exchange rate shock 
affects industrial production and inflation. Thus, our investigations may be a relevant 
contribution to the fixed versus flexible exchange rate dilemma that seems to a crucial part of 
the discussion related to the possible implications of sacrificing monetary sovereignty in the 
Eurozone candidate countries. 
Negative exchange rate shock had positive effect on industrial production in all ten 
European transition economies, though we experienced some differences across countries 
according to their exchange rate arrangement. Lagged response of industrial production as 
well as durability of the effect seems to be reduced in the group of “peggers”. In comparison 
with countries with fixed exchange rate arrangement it seems that industrial production in the 
group of “floaters” increased with slightly longer lag, while its overall effect seems to be 
more significant and durable in this group of countries thought it has died out in the long run 
too. It seems that sudden exchange rate shifts under flexible exchange rate arrangement 
provides more convenient vehicle for price incentives associated with international 
redistribution effects. On the other hand exchange rate shifts under fixed exchange rate 
regime associated with volatility of the main foreign anchoring currency seem to have nearly 
immediate but significantly reduced effect on industrial production. Crisis period affected 
responses of industrial production to the exchange rate shock. In the group of “peggers” we 
observed generally more dynamic response (increase) of industrial production to the negative 
exchange rate shock. It seems that higher volatility on foreign exchange markets during the 
crisis period leads to more dynamic adjustments to changes in foreign competitiveness due to 
acceleration in redistribution effects on the international level. Crisis period slightly reduced 
the length of the lagged response in industrial production to the negative exchange rate shock 
in the group of “floaters” reflecting similarly higher sensitivity to the exchange rate related 
price effects. 
Countries from the group of “peggers” experienced a moderate trend of the inflation 
increase since the first month after the shock. Although a negative effect largely culminated 
within first six months after the shock, its pro-inflationary effect slightly decreased over the 
time and completely died out during the second year after the shock. On the hand, initial 
inflation pressure of the negative exchange rate shock in countries from the group of 
“floaters” seems to be reduced. However, negative effect of the shock increased during the 
second half of the year since the shock. Crisis period was associated with generally reduced 
inflation pressures initiated by the negative exchange rate shock as countries from the group 
of “peggers” experienced considerably faster recovery of the price stability (negative effect of 
the shock to the price level died out much earlier) than in countries from the group of 
“floaters”. It seems that the crisis period reduced a durability of the shock from the exchange 
rate sudden shift even more. We suggest that stabilizing effects of the exchange rate nominal 
anchor during the crisis period contributed to the overall reduction of price related effects 
associated with external price shocks. At the same time, crisis period increased vulnerability 
of the domestic price level to the unexpected shifts in the short-term leading path of exchange 
rate. While the total short-term contribution of the negative exchange rate shock to the price 
level is comparable in both periods, the overall effect of the shock culminated in most 
countries from the group of “floaters” with significantly reduced lag (during first three 
months). 
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